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Abstract
In the tax policy debate, di¤erentiation of value-added taxes is often justied
by distributional concerns. Our quantitative analysis for Germany indicates
that such concerns are misplaced. We nd that the abolition of VAT di¤eren-
tiation has only negligible redistributive e¤ects. Instead, reduced VAT rates
are found to act as industry-specic subsidies. Whereas the overall welfare ef-
fects of pure VAT reforms are very small, a revenue-neutral introduction of a
harmonised VAT combined with reductions in the marginal income tax rates
or social security contributions turns out to yield substantial welfare gains for
all households.
Keywords: VAT, tax reforms, distribution, e¢ciency, applied general equi-
librium
JEL Code: D58, H22, H24
Corresponding author: Christoph Böhringer, Department of Economics, Carl von Ossietzky
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1 Introduction
Consumption taxation through value-added taxes (VAT) is usually considered as
a relatively e¢cient way of raising public funds. Theoretical analysis points to the
neutrality of VAT with respect to intertemporal consumption decisions, whereas in-
come taxes tend to distort the trade-o¤ between consumption and savings.1 On the
other hand, a uniform VAT is often criticised on the basis of its allegedly regres-
sive distributional e¤ects. Reecting distributional concerns, many countries apply
VAT reductions to specic goods, which make up a larger share in the consump-
tion of low-income households. In the EU, all countries but one use reduced VAT
rates for specic consumption commodities. Especially in the old EU member states
VAT reductions on food, water, medication, and public transport are quite common
(European Commission, 2005).
This paper investigates the rationale for VAT di¤erentiation on distributional grounds.
Since VAT di¤erentiation is not associated with the individual ability to pay of dif-
ferent consumers, it is an indirect device of distribution. Obviously, there are more
direct instruments of distributive policy such as income taxation or monetary trans-
fers. From an applied policy perspective, we must therefore be concerned with how
large the redistributive e¤ects of VAT di¤erentiation are in practice, and whether or
not alternative policy instruments are more e¤ective as a means of redistribution.
Answers to these questions cannot be provided by abstract theoretical considera-
tions but depend on the precise type of products favoured by VAT reductions and
the demand and supply conditions on the respective markets, which are determined
by household preferences, production technologies, factor endowments, and market
structures.
We adopt an applied general equilibrium (AGE) approach to investigate e¢ciency
and distributional impacts of structural VAT reforms based on empirically observed
data for Germany. The AGE approach provides a comprehensive framework for
studying the e¤ects of policy interference on all markets of an economy, rigorously
based on microeconomic theory. The simultaneous consideration of the origin and
1In the public nance literature a number of reasons are mentioned why VAT di¤erentiation
might be justied under e¢ciency considerations: (i) administrative and compliance costs (Keen
and Mintz, 2004), (ii) the role of the shadow economy, (iii) di¤erences in price elasticities of goods,
or (iv) complementarity of consumption goods with untaxed leisure activities. More recently, VAT
reductions have also been proposed as a measure to stimulate employment in labour intensive
service industries (Holmlund, 2002).
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use of the agents income makes it possible to address both economy-wide e¢ciency
as well as distributional impacts of policy regulation. This has made AGE models
a standard tool for the quantitative analysis in many policy areas including scal,
trade and environmental policy.
Building on the pioneering work by Shoven and Whalley (1972), AGE models have
been widely used for the economy-wide impact assessment of tax policy reforms
(for surveys see e.g. Shoven and Whalley 1984, 1992 or Kehoe and Kehoe 1996). A
detailed evaluation of distributive e¤ects of tax policy reforms with a disaggrega-
tion of the household sector has been undertaken in various country-specic AGE
studies: Early examples include the seminal contribution by Ballard et al. (1985)
for the USA, the analysis by Piggott and Whalley (1985) for England, or the work
by Keller (1980) for the Netherlands. AGE analyses with a strong focus on dis-
tributive aspects have also evolved in the intersection of international trade and
development economics such as Bourguignon et al. (2005) for Indonesia or Corora-
ton and Cockburn (2007) for the Philippines (for a survey see Davies, 2003). Studies
of the distributive consequences of income taxation and public transfers, however,
have largely been performed in a partial equilibrium framework, typically based on
microsimulation tools (Gupta and Kapur, 2000). Among the few exceptions that
bridge the micro-macro gap for public transfer analysis within an AGE approach
are Coady and Harris (2004) and Arntz et al. (2006).
The strand of AGE literature that is directed to the analysis of VAT reforms is
relatively small. Ballard et al. (1987) analyse VAT in the USA as a possibility to
increase the e¢ciency of the tax system. Hamilton and Whalley (1989) use a static
AGE model to explore special intricacies of the interaction between federal and
provincial taxes in Canada. Gottfried and Wiegard (1991) compare two di¤erent
institutional settings for VAT implementation, i.e. tax exemption vs. zero rating,
for the German economy. Dixon and Rimmer (1999) investigate VAT reforms in
Australia with a special focus on the induced international trade e¤ects. Åvitsland
and Aasness (2004) combine an AGE model and a microsimulation model to assess
VAT reform scenarios for Norway. Kaerney and van Heerden (2004) analyse the
economic implications of a zero VAT rate on food in South Africa.
The German case is characterised by a standard and a reduced VAT rate. The latter
applies predominantly to food, public transport, and print-media products. The
analysis of VAT reforms thus requires a di¤erentiation of the nal demand system
by consumption categories (e.g., Andrikopoulos et al., 2003). Furthermore, we must
2
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distinguish di¤erent household types to quantify distributive impacts. The results of
our AGE simulations conrm doubts about the e¤ectiveness of reduced VAT rates as
a redistributive instrument and point to welfare gains from uniform taxation. These
welfare gains are boosted if taxes other than VAT are included in the tax reform
even if we impose the requirement of distributional neutrality: The possibility of
Pareto improvements from VAT harmonisation may be an important message to
policymakers. Another key nding is that  from a sectoral (industrial) perspective
 reduced VAT rates work mainly as distortionary subsidies to the respective nal-
goods producers and their intermediate-input suppliers.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of
the model structure and its parametrisation. Section 3 provides the results of the
scenario simulations. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model and Parametrisation
For our simulation analysis we draw on a standard AGE model which has been re-
ned to address central issues of VAT reforms.2 The most important extension in the
VAT context refers to the disaggregation of the household sector into income terciles,
where each tercile features a special income composition and consumption structure.
For the empirical parametrisation of the model, various data sources including the
German Input-Output Table for 1997, the production-consumption transition ma-
trix  the so-called Z-matrix, and the German Income and Expenditure Survey
(EVS) have been combined to form a consistent benchmark dataset.
In the following, we rst summarise the basic features of our AGE model (Sec-
tion 2.1). A detailed description of the household representation follows in Section
2.2. Finally, we discuss data and calibration issues (Section 2.3). A comprehensive
algebraic summary of the model is provided in the appendix.
2Other issue-driven modications of the standard model include recent analyses of climate policy
(Böhringer and Lange, 2005) and labour market regulations (Böhringer, Boeters, and Feil, 2005).
3
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2.1 Basic Model Structure
Firms and factors of production
The AGE model underlying our VAT reform analysis for Germany features 69 indus-
tries (production sectors). In each industry, output is produced from intermediate
inputs, capital and labour. Production possibilities are characterised through nested
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production functions, which describe the
trade-o¤ between various inputs. Perfect competition implies that there are no pure
prots. The primary factors labour and capital are remunerated according to their
respective marginal productivities. Cost minimisation by rms yields demand func-
tions for production inputs at the industry level.
Y
sectoral output
intermediate inputsKLE aggregate
KE aggregatelabour
M
from different sectors
KLE
KE
capital energy
E
different energy carriersforeigndomestic
K
Figure 1: Production structure for a representative industry
The domestic labour market exhibits frictions with equilibrium unemployment. More
specically, we adopt a wage-curve relationship where the rate of unemployment is
explained by a wage-bargaining mechanism following Layard et al. (1991, Chapter
2). Labour is mobile across domestic industries but internationally immobile. Capital
is mobile both across domestic industries and the national border. Foreign capital
4
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exports and imports are fully elastic, i.e. the international interest rate is exogenous
in our small open economy setting. In domestic production, we distinguish capital
by domestic and foreign origin (see Figure 1). Outows of domestic capital to the
international capital market as well as inows of foreign capital to the domestic
capital market are not perfectly elastic  the calibration of the associated domestic
capital export and import functions is laid out in Section 2.3.3. Technically speaking,
the model includes only capital services, where capital stocks are implicit through a
constant stock-to-yearly-services ratio.
In Figure 1 we use the following notation:
Y := elasticity of substitution between the aggregate of intermediate pro-
duction inputs and the input composite of labour, capital, and en-
ergy,
KLE := elasticity of substitution between the capital-energy aggregate and
labour,
M := elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs entering the
industry composite of intermediate inputs,
KE := elasticity of substitution between capital and aggregate energy,
K := elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign capital,
E := elasticity of substitution between di¤erent energy carriers entering
the aggregate energy input.
Foreign trade
Domestically produced goods are converted through a constant-elasticity-of-trans-
formation function into goods destined for the domestic market and the export
market, respectively. Export and import prices in foreign currency are considered
as exogenous (small-open-economy assumption). Analogously to the export side, we
adopt the Armington assumption of product heterogeneity for imports (Armington,
1969). A CES function characterises the trade-o¤ between imported and domesti-
cally produced varieties of the same good. The Armington good enters intermediate
and nal demand. Foreign closure of the model is warranted through the balance-
of-payment (BOP) constraint: The total value of exports equals the total value of
imports accounting for an initial BOP decit or surplus given by the base year statis-
tics.3 The BOP constraint thereby determines the real exchange rate which indicates
the (endogenous) value of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the foreign currency (the
latter being exogenous in a small-open-economy setting).
3Exports and imports include both goods and trans-border capital services.
5
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Government budget
Given our focus on VAT reform, the model emphasises the role of consumption
taxation. The VAT captures di¤erences across consumption categories via three
levels of the VAT rate (full rate, reduced rate, and tax exempt goods). Furthermore,
we account for the indirect impact of value-added taxation in the production of goods
which are tax exempt. Besides the VAT, direct taxes and social security contributions
of households are incorporated. Social security contributions are assumed to be
proportional to labour income while income taxation takes the form of a linear
progressive schedule, i.e. a tax allowance combined with a constant marginal tax
rate. Finally, the model features industry-specic output taxes and subsidies as well
as import and export levies.
Private households
We distinguish three representative households capturing the lower, middle, and up-
per tercile of the income distribution. Each household takes a labour-leisure decision
and chooses between di¤erent consumption goods. Details about the characteristics
of the disaggregated households are provided in the following section.
2.2 Representation of the Household Sector
2.2.1 Household Disaggregation
The private household sector is disaggregated into three households representing,
respectively, the lower, middle and upper income tercile of the households according
to the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS). The EVS is a representa-
tive household survey by the German Federal Statistical O¢ce. The 1998 sample
comprises 62.000 households. The rst part of the survey reports data on household
structure, housing situation, nancial and tangible assets as well as debt. The sec-
ond part contains income and expenditure items adapted to the classication of the
input-output accounts.
Households are grouped into the three income terciles according to equivalent
household income. Household income is divided by the respective number of house-
hold members in order to compare households of di¤erent sizes. We use the square
root of the household size as equivalence scale in order to compute the respective
number of household members, thereby reecting economies of scale due to xed
6
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costs in household consumption.4 The income and expenditure values of the three
ctitious representative households are then set to the arithmetic mean of the re-
spective income class.
Table 1 summarises basic characteristics of the household types. Disposable income
varies substantially across the three terciles. Taking the rst tercile as the basis of
comparison, disposable income of the second tercile is higher by roughly one half,
whereas the disposable income of the third tercile is three times as high. Less than
two thirds of total gross income (the case of the rst tercile even not more than one
third) are made up of factor income. The residual income consists mainly of transfer
payments, pensions and private credit (with savings meaning gross savings). The
income tax schedule is progressive as stated by the di¤erences between average and
marginal tax rates5; in addition, we report the implicit tax allowances associated
with a linear progressive income tax scheme. Average social security contributions
(SSC) are decreasing in income due to an assessment threshold for the SSC basis.
lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile
Disposable Income 1994 (89%) 3105 (83%) 6101 (84%)
Consumption 1738 (78%) 2317 (62%) 3674 (51%)
Savings 256 (11%) 788 (21%) 2427 (33%)
Taxes and SSC 237 (11%) 618 (17%) 1179 (16%)
Factor income 753 (34%) 2045 (55%) 4385 (60%)
Other income 1477 (66%) 1678 (45%) 2895 (40%)
Average tax rate 10.0% 12.8% 16.5%
Average SSC 23.5% 20.4% 12.7%
Marginal tax rate 14.9% 16.1% 22.1%
Implied tax allowance 247 417 1127
Rows (1) to (5): absolute values in e per month and percentage values as
shares in gross income; rows (6) to (8): percentage of factor or labour
income, respectively
Table 1: Household characteristics according to EVS
Table 2 reports the consumption shares of the household terciles by VAT categories.
It can be seen that the share of the three VAT categories in consumption is rather
stable (upper part of Table 2). This is especially the case for the tax-exempt goods,
4Cf. e.g. Biewen (2000) or Atkinson et al. (1995, 18¤.) for alternative scales.
5Tax rates are reported relative to gross factor income.
7
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while the shares of the reduced-rate goods are slightly decreasing and those of the
full-rate goods are slightly increasing in income. The gures in Table 2 already
suggest that a di¤erentiated VAT rate may not be well suited as a redistributive
device. In relation to the disposable income (lower part of Table 2), the share of all
VAT categories is decreasing, simply because of the increasing propensity to save.
lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile
Share in consumption
VAT 0% 38.8% 37.2% 37.2%
VAT 7% 27.3% 25.6% 23.7%
VAT 16% 33.9% 37.2% 39.1%
Share in disposable income
VAT 0% 33.8% 27.7% 22.4%
VAT 7% 23.8% 19.1% 14.3%
VAT 16% 29.5% 27.8% 23.6%
Table 2: Household consumption structure
The expenditure shares of various consumption good categories (see Table 3) are
calculated as fractions of the so-called income available for expenditures. The lat-
ter is dened as the sum of disposable income, sales of goods and property, pensions
from private insurances, liquidation of nancial and tangible assets and from bank
and consumption credit loans. The expenditure categories of the EVS are adjusted
in order to warrant consistency with the 12-goods-classication of the Z-matrix. In
order to assess the impacts of a structural VAT reform, detailed EVS expenditure
shares for each of the 12 categories have been grouped into categories with VAT of
16 percent, 7 percent or tax exemption, respectively  see Table 3 for an explicit
overview.6
2.2.2 Consumption Structure
The consumption structure of the three representative households is reected in the
nesting of multi-level utility functions adopted within the numerical AGE model
(see Figure 2). At the top level, we specify a consumption-savings decision under
static expectations following Ballard et al. (1985). Current utility is then composed
6The data underlying Table 3 has been provided by the German federal statistical o¢ce in the
form of a special Z-matrix di¤erentiated by VAT rates.
8
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share in total share of share of share of
Consumption category consumption VAT 0% VAT 7% VAT 16%
Food and beverages 12.4%  95.2% 4.8%
Alcohol and tobacco 3.5%  8.8% 91.2%
Clothing and footwear 5.8%   100.0%
Housing, water, energy 33.6% 82.3% 2.4% 15.3%
Household equipment 6.4% 5.9%  94.1%
Health 3.5% 85.4%  14.6%
Transport 10.5% 0.4% 14.5% 85.1%
Communication 2.7% 14.3%  85.7%
Recreation and culture 12.1% 28.1% 30.3% 41.6%
Education 0.5% 93.4%  6.6%
Restaurants and hotels 5.0%  49.4% 50.6%
Other goods and services 4.3% 65.8% 0.3% 33.8%
Table 3: VAT shares by consumption categories
of leisure and commodity consumption. Commodity consumption in turn is an ag-
gregate of food consumption and other consumption goods (which are then further
decomposed at the lower level). We explicitly represent food consumption because it
is the most important consumption goods category to which the reduced VAT rate
is applied in Germany. All consumption good categories are nally broken down into
the three VAT categories (tax exempt goods, reduced and full VAT rate) according
to their empirical shares (see Table 2).
In Figure 2 we use the following notation:
U := elasticity of substitution between current and future consumption,
CU := elasticity of substitution between current consumption and leisure,
C := elasticity of substitution between food and the non-food consump-
tion aggregate,
LE := elasticity of substitution between leisure of high skilled and low
skilled labour,
V AT := elasticity of substitution between commodities subject to (three)
di¤erent VAT categories,
NF := elasticity of substitution between consumption commodities enter-
ing the non-food consumption composite.
9
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CU
current utility
leisure consumption
food
C
VAT
3 VAT categories
non-food
NF
NF goods
VAT VAT VAT
3 VAT categories for each good
U
utility
future utility (savings)
Figure 2: Consumption structure of representative household
2.3 Parametrisation
2.3.1 Input-Output Data
In our comparative-static analysis, policy e¤ects are assessed with respect to a ref-
erence situation  the benchmark  where no policy changes apply. The benchmark
is typically determined by economic transactions in a particular benchmark year.
As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, benchmark quantities and
prices  together with exogenous elasticities  are used to calibrate the model. They
determine the free parameters of the functional forms that capture production tech-
nologies and consumer preferences.
We use the input-output table of the German federal statistical o¢ce for the year
1997 as the central data source for model calibration. The rst quadrant of the
input-output table reports intermediate inputs for each sector. The second quadrant
10
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provides information on nal demand components: private and public consumption,
investment, inventory changes, and exports. Factor payments to labour and cap-
ital (combined with prots in the row operating surplus) are included in the
third quadrant which also reports the inows of foreign goods and services to each
production sector. With regard to taxes, the standard input-output table records
product-specic taxes and subsidies as well as the VAT.
Output by production sector is linked to consumption by private households in terms
of expenditure categories through the Z-matrix, see above.
2.3.2 Calibration of the Utility Function
The calibration of the parameters of the utility function (see Figure 2) requires the
integration of empirical estimates of the elasticities of savings, labour supply, and
consumption demand.
Savings elasticity
At the top level of the utility function (see appendix for the algebraic specication),
the following elasticity of savings with respect to the interest rate can be derived for
household h:
"h;S = 
U
h (1  h;S) + h;K
where
h;S := share of savings in extended income,
h;K := share of capital income in extended income.
Given household specic share parameters, we calibrate Uh in consistency with em-
pirical estimates around 0.4 for the savings elasticity (see Boskin 1978, Elmendorf,
1996, Bernheim, 2001).
Labour supply elasticity
The implied uncompensated labour supply elasticity, "h;L for household h is:
"h;L = (h   1)

CUh +
 
Uh   
CU
h

h;LE) +
 
Uh   1

h;CUh;LE   I;h

(1)
where
11
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h := labour endowment as a multiple of actual labour supply,
h;LE := share of leisure in value of current utility,
h;CU := share of current utility in extended income,
I;h := share of labour endowment in extended income.
Given exogenous shares and calibrated elasticities "h;L and Uh , we can solve equation
(1) for the unknown elasticity CU : as we set labour supply (h) uniformly to 1.75
(70 hours of weekly labour endowment relative to an average weekly working time of
40 hours). Our reading of the empirical literature on labour supply elasticities (for a
survey see, e.g., Borjas, 2000) is that there are no strong results on income-bracket-
specic labour supply elasticities and that uncompensated labour supply elasticities
are centred around 0.15. In this vein, we calibrate the model to "h;L = 0:15 for all
households.
Consumption demand elasticities
At the lower nests of the utility tree of Figure 2, we can solve recursively for the
elasticities of interest, C and NF , taking the upper-level elasticities as given:
Ch =  
1
1  h;F

"F + 
CU
h h;F (1  h;C) + 
U
h h;F h;C(1  h;CU)
+h;F h;Ch;CU ]
NFh =  
1
1  h;NF

"NF + 
C
h
h;NF (1  h;NF ) + 
CU
h
h;NF h;NF (1  h;C)
+Uh
h;NF h;NF h;C(1  h;CU)  h;NF h;NF h;Ch;CU

where
"F := own-price elasticity of food demand,
"NF := average own-price elasticity of demand for non-food goods,
h;C := share of consumption in current utility,
h;F := share of food in the consumption goods aggregate,
h;NF := share of all non-food goods in the consumption goods aggregate,
h;NF := average share of individual non-food goods in the non-food
aggregate.
With respect to the price elasticities of consumption demand we draw on Chen
(1999), who estimates consumption demand parameters for 42 OECD countries.
12
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Chen uses Theils (1980) di¤erential approach. His estimates for Germany are pro-
vided in Table 4 together with the mean of the estimates for the 42 OECD countries.
Because of diverging denitions in product categories, we can only distinguish be-
tween the price elasticity of food (-.222) and the average price elasticity for the
remaining 7 categories (-.563) in the model.7
Product category Germany Mean
Food -.222 -.220
Clothing -.423 -.422
Housing -.426 -.432
Durable consumption goods -.501 -.585
Health -.844 -.734
Tra¢c -.591 -.665
Recreation -.608 -.628
Other -.547 -.605
Table 4: Price elasticities of consumption demand
2.3.3 Calibration of Capital Supply and Demand
For the elasticity of domestic capital imports with respect to the domestic inter-
est rate, "KM ; we can calculate from the production function (Figure 1 with the
respective elasticities of substitution ):
"KM = 
K(1  KM)  
KE(1  KM)(1  K)  
KEL(1  KM)K(1  KE)
where
K := elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign capital,
KM := share of capital imports in domestic capital use,
K := share of capital in the capital-energy sub-aggregate,
KE := share of KE in the capital-energy-labour sub-aggregate,
We calibrate K to match values of the capital import ratio, KM = 0:18 (French
and Poterba, 1991), and the elasticity of capital imports with respect to the domestic
interest rate "KM = 2:4 (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2001).
7Price elasticities of food consumption in the same range have been identied for a number of
countries more recently by Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2006).
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The elasticity of domestic capital exports with respect to the domestic interest rate
can be computed from the constant-elasticity-of-transformation function, splitting
up domestic savings into capital exports and domestically used capital. Here we
have:
"KX =  
KS(1  KX)
where
KS := elasticity of transformation between capital exports and domesti-
cally used capital,
KX := share of capital exports in domestic savings.
KS is calibrated to values of the capital export ratio, KX = 0:21 (French and
Poterba, 1991), and the elasticity of capital exports with respect to the domestic
interest rate "KX =  2:4 (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2001).
3 Simulations
In our simulations of revenue-neutral VAT reforms for the German economy we
replace the di¤erentiated VAT rate by a uniform rate (while the treatment of tax-
exempt goods remains unchanged). We perform three types of tax reforms. The
rst type is a pure VAT reform, where we introduce a uniform VAT rate at an
endogenously determined level which keeps public revenues constant. The second
type includes other taxes than VAT for revenue recycling. Here we set the rate for
commodities with lower VAT (i.e. 7%) at the normal level (i.e. 16%) and balance
the public budget through uniform reductions of either marginal income tax rates
(MITR) or social security contributions (SSC), or through an increase in the income
tax allowance (ITA).8
The alternative instruments of revenue recycling will a¤ect households di¤erently. In
order to separate e¢ciency considerations from distributional concerns, we therefore
carry out a third type of simulations with non-uniform adjustments in recycling
instrument, which  beyond revenue-neutrality  also warrant distributive neutrality
across households. Table 5 provides a full list of the simulations.
8It should be kept in mind that social security contributions are levied only on labour, whereas
income taxes are levied on both labour and capital. See the discussion at the end of Section 3.1.
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Scenario Description
1 Pure value-added tax (VAT) reform
2 Uniform cut in marginal income tax rates (MITR)
3 Distributively-neutral cut in marginal income tax rates (MITR)
4 Uniform increase in income tax allowance (ITA)
5 Distributively-neutral increase in income tax allowance (ITA)
6 Uniform cut in social security contributions (SSC)
7 Distributively-neutral cut in social security contributions (SSC)
Table 5: Overview of simulations
3.1 Distributive E¤ects and E¢ciency
Our discussion of simulation results starts with a scenario in which the di¤eren-
tiated VAT (16% and 7%, respectively) is replaced in a revenue-neutral way by a
uniform VAT rate at an intermediate level (Scenario 1). Taking general equilibrium
repercussions into account, the level of the post-reform VAT amounts to 14.1% (as
compared to a normal VAT rate of 16% before).
The distributive e¤ects of this pure VAT reform are reported in Table 6 both in
terms of equivalent variation in percent of the benchmark income9 and in terms of
absolute changes. Reecting the higher share of goods with a reduced VAT rate in
the expenditures of the lowest tercile (see Table 2), Scenario 1 has some regressive
distributional e¤ects. However, these e¤ects from switching to a uniform VAT are
rather small. Moreover, the gain for the upper tercile is higher only in absolute but
not in relative terms.
Scenario 1 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile average
EV in per cent -0.19 -0.00 +0.14 +0.05
EV in e per month -4.5 -0.1 11.7 2.4
Table 6: Pure VAT reform
Next, we analyse di¤erent varieties of tax reforms that use taxes other than the
VAT itself in order to achieve the balanced budget. In Scenario 2, we uniformly (in
percentage points) cut the marginal income tax rate (MITR) to warrant revenue
neutrality.
9Equivalent variation captures changes in all utility-generating items (see Figure 2), including
leisure.
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Scenario 2 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile average
pre-reform MITR 14.9% 16.1% 22.1%
post-reform MITR 14.1% 15.3% 21.3%
EV in per cent -0.53 -0.04 +0.29 +0.07
EV in e per month -12.2 -1.5 +24.3 +3.5
Table 7: Uniform cut in MITR
Table 7 indicates that the distributional e¤ects are larger than for the case of a pure
VAT reform. While the middle tercile is still virtually una¤ected by the reform, the
losses for the lower tercile and the gains for the upper tercile are more than double
the respective gures of Scenario 1. Uniform cuts in the marginal income tax rate
are favourable for the upper tercile because taxable income makes up the largest
fraction of total income in this tercile.
In Scenario 3, we maintain the marginal income tax as the recycling instrument for
balancing the public budget, but impose the restriction of distributive neutrality.
The marginal income tax rate (MITR) is now endogenously adjusted so that the
percentage change in EV is the same across all households. Table 8 summarises the
implications of this (non-uniform) adjustment rule.
Scenario 3 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile average
pre-reform MITR 14.9% 16.1% 22.1%
post-reform MITR 12.5% 15.2% 21.6%
EV in per cent +0.07 +0.07 +0.07 +0.07
EV in e per month +1.6 +2.7 +5.7 +3.3
Table 8: Distributively-neutral cut in MITR
The tax reduction of the MITR (in terms of the tax rate) is highest for the lower
tercile ( 2:4 p.p.) and lowest for the upper tercile ( 0:5 p.p.). This results in a
uniform increase in the equivalent variation of 0.07%.
Tax revenue recycling through the income tax may alternatively be based on the
income tax allowance (ITA). Table 9 reports scenario results for the case of a uniform
increase (in e) of the tax allowance for all households (Scenario 4).
In this scenario, all households face welfare losses, reecting the implied increase in
the marginal tax burden. Moreover, the losses are almost identical across terciles.
This latter result can be explained by two countervailing e¤ects that more or less
16
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Scenario 4 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile average
pre-reform ITA in e 247 417 1126
post-reform ITA in e 261 430 1140
EV in per cent -0.13 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09
EV in e per month -2.9 -2.6 -7.2 -4.2
Table 9: Uniform increase in ITA
cancel each other out. On the one hand, a given increase of the ITA in e means a
lower relative increase for the upper terciles. On the other hand, the upper terciles
have higher marginal income tax rates, so that they benet more from a given
relative increase in the tax allowance.
The policy settings for Scenario 5 di¤er from those of Scenario 4 only in that tax
allowances are di¤erentiated endogenously in order to yield proportional welfare
changes across all households. Distributional results are provided in Table 10. As
Scenario 4 was almost neutral, distributionally, the results for Scenario 5 are very
much alike.
Scenario 5 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile average
pre-reform ITA in e 247 417 1126
post-reform ITA in e 263 430 1139
EV in per cent -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
EV in e per month -2.0 -3.5 -7.2 -4.2
Table 10: Distributively-neutral increase in ITA
Given distributional neutrality for Scenarios 3 and 5, both scenarios can be compared
in e¢ciency terms. We can then see that Scenario 5 induces (small) welfare losses,
while Scenario 3 leads to (small) e¢ciency gains. The reasoning behind this is that
in Scenario 5 we essentially replace a lump-sum tax by a distortive tax, whereas in
Scenario 3 we trade o¤ two distortive taxes against each other.
The third instrument of tax revenue recycling considered in our analysis are the
social security contributions (SSC). Again, we rst show the case where the SSC are
changed uniformly (Scenario 6), and then di¤erentiate the SSC of the households
endogenously to achieve proportional welfare gains across households (Scenario 7).
A uniform proportional decrease of the SSC  as in Table 11  leaves the middle ter-
cile substantially better o¤. The welfare gain for the upper tercile is also signicant,
17
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Scenario 6 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile average
pre-reform SSC 23.5% 20.4% 12.7%
post-reform SSC 21.4% 18.5% 11.5%
EV in per cent -0.29 +0.23 +0.21 +0.14
EV in e per month -6.7 +9.1 +17.9 +6.8
Table 11: Uniform cut in SSC
whereas the lower tercile clearly loses. The fact that the middle tercile benets most
is explained by the highest share of labour income (the tax base for the SSC) in this
group. In contrast, for the lower tercile, transfer income makes up a large part of
total income, and for the upper tercile capital income gains in weight.
Scenario 7 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile average
pre-reform SSC 23.5% 20.4% 12.7%
post-reform SSC 19.9% 18.8% 11.7%
EV in per cent +0.12 +0.12 +0.12 +0.12
EV in e per month +2.8 +4.9 +10.2 +6.0
Table 12: Distributively-neutral cut in SSC
When we adjust the SSC in a way that assures distributive neutrality (see Table
12), the cut in SSC is highest for the lower tercile ( 3:6 p.p.) and lowest for the
upper tercile ( 1:0 p.p.). In relative terms, however, the cut is now lowest for the
middle tercile (to compensate for its high share of labour income). The uniform
welfare increase amounts to 0.12%, which stands out as the highest value across all
(distributionally neutral) scenarios and makes the SSC the most attractive candidate
for actual tax reforms.
Social Security Contributions (SSC) are levied on labour only, whereas income taxes
are levied on both labour and capital income. Revenue-neutral reductions of social
security contributions (SSC) thus work as a direct cut of labour costs, whereas a
reduction of the marginal income tax rate (MITR) will reduce the tax burden on
labour as well as capital. The favourable results for SSC reect that, in our model,
capital taxation is associated with smaller distortions than labour income (connected
to the tax elasticities of the respective income categories). However, our static AGE
model does not explicitly consider the intertemporal dimensions of savings and in-
vestment. As a consequence, it is not well suited to compare the e¢ciency e¤ects of
18
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capital taxation with those of labour taxation. Caution is therefore warranted re-
garding the more favourable results for the SSC scenarios as compared to the MITR
scenarios.10
3.2 Macroeconomic E¤ects
Table 13 summarises the macroeconomic consequences across four of our scenarios:
the pure VAT reform (Scenario 1) and the three scenarios based on alternative
tax recycling instruments (Scenarios 3, 5 and 7) where distributional e¤ects are
compensated.
Scenario 1 3 5 7
Tax recycling instrument VAT MITR ITA SSC
GDP 0.12 0.36 -0.07 0.41
Employment 0.03 0.16 -0.21 0.33
Domestic capital use 0.25 0.64 0.12 0.51
Total consumption 0.03 0.03 -0.33 0.22
Total investment 0.14 0.57 0.22 0.54
Imports -0.31 -0.21 -0.59 -0.05
Exports -0.02 0.48 -0.40 0.48
Table entries are given as percentage changes.
Table 13: Macroeconomic e¤ects of VAT reform
The results are consistent with the consideration of the EV values in Section 3.1
where the SSC and the MITR were the most favourable tax recycling instrument
followed by the VAT and the ITA. As Table 13 shows this ranking is generally
reected by the gures for GDP and employment, domestic capital use, aggregate
consumption and exports.
3.3 Industry E¤ects
Table 14 reports the impacts of VAT reforms on the output of individual industries.
We condense the information on the 69 sectors of the model into a few aggregate
10The theoretical literature on optimal taxation suggests that the excess burden of capital tax-
ation is higher than that of labour taxation (e.g. Chamley, 1986, Atkeson et al., 1999).
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indicators: the (unweighted) average rate of growth of the output across industries,
the standard deviation of growth rates, the number of growing and shrinking indus-
tries, maximum and minimum of the industries growth rates as well as the 10th
and 90th percentile.
Scenario 1 3 5 7
Tax recycling instrument VAT MITR ITA SSC
Av. increase in production 0.10 0.42 -0.18 0.41
Standard deviation 1.09 1.18 1.17 1.07
Number of growing industries 35 46 23 53
Number of shrinking industries 34 23 46 16
Maximum growth 5.47 5.66 5.42 5.59
Minimum growth -1.89 -1.49 -2.54 -1.30
90th percentile 0.56 1.31 0.41 0.75
10th percentile -0.63 -0.38 -1.06 -0.44
Entries are changes in percent (except number of growing/shrinking industries).
Table 14: Industry e¤ects
The gures in Table 14 conrm our previous ranking of the tax recycling instru-
ments, although MITR and SSC are almost indistinguishable, in terms of industry
e¤ects. Around the average values, there is a considerable spread in the industry-level
outcomes. This spread is rather robust across the scenarios. At the disaggregated
industry-level, the performance across sectors is also rather stable: Financial and
Insurance Services as well as Research and Development are always among the in-
dustries that gain the most, whereas Communication and Media, Other Vehicles and
Hotel and Catering Industry show the largest losses.11
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the economic e¤ects of a structural VAT reform
for the German economy. Based on an AGE framework tailored to the requirements
of VAT reform analysis, we have simulated several revenue-neutral variants of abol-
ishing the reduced VAT rate in Germany. We have analysed a pure VAT reform,
11A detailed table of industry level results is available upon request.
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where the di¤erentiated VAT is replaced with a uniform rate, that is about two per-
centage point lower than the standard rate of 16 %, and further scenarios in which
tax revenue is recycled through other taxes: the marginal income tax rate (MITR),
the income tax allowance (ITA) or the social security contributions (SSC).
Our main ndings can be summarised as follows: The abolition of the reduced VAT
rate in itself has only a small distributional e¤ect towards larger inequality. There-
fore, VAT di¤erentiation can hardly be considered as an important means of re-
distribution. When we combine the abolition of reduced VAT rates with revenue
recycling through reduction of the marginal income tax rate or cuts in social secu-
rity contributions, there is scope for signicant gains in overall welfare. The income
tax allowance, in contrast, produces welfare losses if used as a tax recycling instru-
ment. These results also hold if we consider distributionally-neutral reforms where
tax rates or social security contributions are adjusted di¤erently across the income
distribution, ensuring that all households equally benet from the reforms.
Policy-induced changes in macroeconomic indicators like GDP, employment, domes-
tic capital use, or aggregate consumption echo the welfare ranking of tax instruments.
While the distributional e¤ects of VAT reforms are within a relatively narrow range,
the industry e¤ects (in terms of variation in industry output) are much more pro-
nounced. This indicates that the VAT rate di¤erentiation should be viewed primarily
as a subsidy to specic industries rather than an instrument of redistribution. From
a political economy point of view, the di¤erent e¤ects at industry level highlight
lobbying interests of adversely a¤ected sectors to work against changes of the actual
VAT structure.
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I Appendix: Model Description
In this appendix we give a full algebraic description of the model. A list of all sets,
indices, variables and parameters can be found in Sections I.1 to I.3. Section I.4 then
presents the equations, classied into price and demand equations, market clearance
conditions and household budget constraints.
I.1 Indices and Index Sets
I.1.1 Sets
c := consumption good index
h := household index
s; ss := industry indices
I.1.2 Index Sets
C := all 12 consumption good categories
ELE := one-element set: electricity
F := one-element set: food consumption
FEN := fossil energy sectors
NEN := non-energy sectors
NF := non-food consumption goods
S := all 69 sectors of the German IOT 1997
V AT := di¤erent VAT rates
I.2 Variables
I.2.1 Quantities
As := Armington good
As;c := intermediate inputs for consumption (Z-matrix)
As;G := intermediate input for government consumption
As;I := intermediate input for investment goods
As;ss := intermediate inputs for production
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As;STK := stock changes
Cc := consumption goods
Cc;h := consumption goods by household
Cc;h;V AT := consumption goods by VAT category
Ch := consumption good aggregate
CUh := current utility (goods consumption and leisure)
Ds := deliveries to the domestic market
Ec := energy aggregate in consumption
Es := energy aggregate in production
FEc := fossil energy aggregate in consumption
FEs := fossil energy aggregate in production
G := government consumption
I := aggregate investment
IG := government investment
K := total capital employed domestically
Ks := capital input
KD := domestically invested capital
KDh := domestically invested capital by household
KEs := capital-energy aggregate in production
KELs := quantity of capital-energy-labour aggregate
KM := capital imports
KXh := capital exports
Ls := labour input
LEh := leisure
Ms := imports
NFh := non-food consumption
Sh := savings
Uh := utility index
Xs := Exports
Ys := production in sector s
I.2.2 Prices
pA;s := price of Armington commodity
pc := price of consumption goods (gross of VAT)
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pC;h := price of consumption goods aggregate
pCU;h := price of current utility aggregate
pp;c := production price of consumption good
pD;s := price of output delivered to the domestic market
pE;c := price of energy aggregate in consumption
pE;s := price of energy aggregate in production
pF := price of food consumption
pG := price index of government consumption
pFE;c := price of fossil energy aggregate in consumption
pFE;s := price of fossil energy aggregate in production
pI := price index for investment goods
pK := rental rate of capital
pKE;s := price of the capital-energy aggregate
pKEL;s := price of the capital-energy-labour aggregate
pKD := price of capital in the domestic market
pKM := price of capital imports
pKS;h := price for capital supply of households
pKX := price of capital exports
pL := wage (net of payroll tax)
pLE;h := price index for leisure
pLS;h := expected revenue from labour supply
pM;s := import prices (net of import tax)
pNF;h := price of non-food aggregate consumption
pU;h := price of utility aggregate (expenditure function)
pS;h := price of future consumption (savings)
pX;s := export prices
pY;s := producer prices
I.2.3 Others
u := unemployment rate
Yh := extended income of households
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I.3 Parameters
I.3.1 Value Shares
i := value share of item i in its respective sub-aggregate in the benchmark
I.3.2 Taxes
tI;h := marginal income tax rate
tKM := capital import tax
tPR := payroll tax (employers social security contributions)
tS;h := social security contributions of households
tV AT := value-added tax on consumption goods
tY;s := output tax (sum of taxes and subsidies)
TAh := income tax allowance
I.3.3 Elasticities
As := EOS between domestic production and imports 2.0
Ch := EOS between food and non-food consumption
CUh := EOS between leisure and current consumption
Ec := EOS between electricity and fossil fuels 1.0
Es := EOS between electricity and fossil fuels 0.25
FEc := EOS between varieties of fossil fuels 1.0
FEs := EOS between varieties of fossil fuels 1.0
K := EOS between domestic capital and capital imports
KEs := EOS between K and E 0.8
KELs := EOS between KE and L 0.5
KS := EOT between domestic and foreign investment
NEc := EOS between NEN goods in consumption 0.5
NFh := EOS between non-food goods
Ts := EOT between domestic use and exports 2.0
Uh := EOS between future and current consumption
V ATc := EOS between good varieties with di¤erent VAT rate 1.0
Ys := EOS between intermediate inputs and KEL aggregate 0.0
Uh is calibrated to reproduce empirical savings elasticities.
CUh is calibrated to reproduce empirical labour supply elasticities.
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K and KS are calibrated to reproduce capital import and export elasticities.
Ch and 
NF
h are calibrated to reproduce consumption good demand elasticities.
The calibration procedures are explained in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 of the main
text.
I.3.4 Others
b := unemployment benets
BOP := balance of payments surplus
Kh := capital endowment by household
Lh := time endowment by household
TRh := benchmark transfers
Any variable (or parameter in the case of taxes) with an upper bar denotes its
benchmark value.
I.4 Model Equations
The model equations are split up into price and demand equations, market clear-
ance conditions, budget constraints and auxiliary equations. There are no explicit
production functions in the model, because all necessary information is contained
in the dual price functions.
To maintain structural symmetry, the equations are written down in their most
general form. In the actual numerical implementation of the model, considerable
simplications are achieved by normalising benchmark prices and quantities to unity
where possible. Some of the CES functions collapse to Cobb-Douglas or Leontief
functions by setting the elasticity of substitution to one or zero, respectively (see
Section I.3.3).
I.4.1 Price Equations
Production is organised according to a nested CES production function. Subsets of
the various industries inputs that are used to form sub-nests of the productions
function can be found in Section I.1.1.
pY;s(1  tY;s)
pY;s(1  tY;s)
=
"
KELs

pKEL;s
pKEL;s
1 Ys
+
X
ss2NEN
sss

pA;ss
pA;ss
1 Ys # 11 Ys
(2)
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pKEL;s
pKEL;s
=
"
KEs

pKE;s
pKE;s
1 KELs
+ Ls

pL(1 + tPR)
pL(1 + tPR)
1 KELs # 11 KELs
(3)
pKE;s
pKE;s
=
"
Ks

pK
pK
1 KEs
+ Es

pE;s
pE;s
1 KEs # 11 KEs
(4)
pE;s
pE;s
=
"
ELEs

pA;ELE
pA;ELE
1 Es
+ FECs

pFE;s
pFE;s
1 Es # 11 Es
(5)
pFE;s
pFE;s
=
" X
i2FEN
is

pA;i
pA;i
1 FEs # 11 FEs
(6)
Output is split into domestic use and exports through a CET function:
pY;s
pY;s
=
"
DYs

pD;s
pD;s
1+Ts
+ Xs

pX;s
pX;s
1+Ts # 11+Ts
(7)
Domestically produced goods and imports are combined to an Armington good:
pA;s
pA;s
=
"
DAs

pD;s
pD;s
1 As
+ Ms

pM;s(1 + tM;s)
pM;s(1 + tM;s)
1 As # 11 As
(8)
Household utility is derived from future and current consumption:
pU;h
pU;h
=
"
CUh

pCU;h
pCU;h
1 Uh
+ Sh

pS;h
pS;h
1 Uh # 11 Uh
; (9)
where the price of savings (future consumption) consists of the following components:
pS;h
pS;h
=
pI
pI
pC;h
pC;h
pKS;h
pKS;h
(10)
Current utility consists of consumption of goods and leisure:
pCU;h
pCU;h
=
"
Ch

pC;h
pC;h
1 CUh
+ LEh

pLE;h
pLE;h
1 CUh # 11 CUh
; (11)
pC;h
pC;h
=
"
Fh

pF
pF
1 Ch
+ NFh

pNF;h
pNF;h
1 Ch # 11+Ch
(12)
pNF;h
pNF;h
=
"X
c2NF
ch

pc
pc
1 NFh # 11 NFh
(13)
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pc
pc
=
"X
V AT
c;V AT

pp;c(1 + tV AT )
pp;c(1 + tV AT )
1 V ATc # 11 V ATc
for c 2 F;NF (14)
Consumption goods are produced from the output of the production sectors with a
CES production function:
pp;c
pp;c
=
" X
s2NEN
sc

pA;s
pA;s
1 NEc
+ Ec

pE;c
pE;c
1 NEc # 11 NEc
(15)
pE;c
pE;c
=
"
ELEc

pA;ELE
pA;ELE
1 Ec
+ FEc

pFE;c
pFE;c
1 Ec # 11 Ec
(16)
pFE;c
pFE;c
=
" X
s2FEN
sc

pA;s
pA;s
1 FEc # 11 FEc
(17)
Government demand is composed of government investment and inputs from the
production sectors in xed proportions:
pG
pG
= IG
pI
pI
+
X
s
sG
pA;s
pA;s
(18)
Investment goods are also produced with xed production coe¢cients:
pI
pI
=
X
s
sI
pA;s
pA;s
(19)
Capital supply is transformed into domestic use and capital exports through a CET
function:
pKS;h
pKS;h
=
"
KD

pKD(1  tI;h)
pKD(1  tI;h)
1+KS
+ KX

pKX
pKX
1+KS# 11+KS
(20)
Domestic and imported capital are imperfect substitutes in production:
pK
pK
=
"
DK

pKD
pKD
1 K
+ KM

pKM(1 + tKM)
pKM(1 + tKM)
1 K# 11 K
(21)
I.4.2 Demand and Supply Equations
Demand for factors of production and intermediate inputs:
Ass;s
Ass;s
=
Ys
Ys

pY;s(1  tY;s)
pY;s(1  tY;s)
pA;ss
pA;ss
Ys
for ss 2 NEN (22)
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KELs
KELs
=
Ys
Ys

pY;s(1  tY;s)
pY;s(1  tY;s)
pKEL;s
pKEL;s
Ys
(23)
Ls
Ls
=
KELs
KELs

pKEL;s
pKEL;s
pL(1 + tPR)
pL(1 + tPR)
KELs
(24)
KEs
KEs
=
KELs
KELs

pKEL;s
pKEL;s
pKE;s
pKE;s
KELs
(25)
Ks
Ks
=
KEs
KEs

pKE;s
pKE;s
pK
pK
KEs
(26)
Es
Es
=
KEs
KEs

pKE;s
pKE;s
pE;s
pE;s
KEs
(27)
AELE;s
AELE;s
=
Es
Es

pE;s
pE;s
pA;ELE
pA;ELE
Es
(28)
FEs
FEs
=
Es
Es

pE;s
pE;s
pFE;s
pFE;s
Es
(29)
Ass;s
Ass;s
=
FEs
FEs

pFE;s
pFE;s
pA;ss
pA;ss
FEs
for ss 2 FEN (30)
Supply to the domestic and export market:
Ds
Ds
=
Ys
Ys

pY;s
pY;s
pD;s
pD;s
Ts
(31)
Xs
Xs
=
Ys
Ys

pY;s
pY;s
pX;s
pX;s
Ts
(32)
Armington demands:
Ds
Ds
=
As
As

pA;s
pA;s
pD;s
pD;s
As
(33)
Ms
Ms
=
As
As

pA;s
pA;s
pM;s(1 + tM;s)
pM;s(1 + tM;s)
As
(34)
Household demand:
Sh
Sh
=
Uh
Uh

pU;h
pU;h
pS;h
pS;h
Uh
(35)
CUh
CUh
=
Uh
Uh

pU;h
pU;h
pCU;h
pCU;h
Uh
(36)
Ch
Ch
=
CUh
CUh

pCU;h
pCU;h
pC;h
pC;h
CUh
(37)
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LEh
LEh
=
CUh
C Uh

pCU;h
pCU;h
pLE;h
pLE;h
CUh
(38)
CF;h
CF;h
=
Ch
Ch

pC;h
pC;h
pF
pF
Ch
(39)
NFh
NF h
=
Ch
Ch

pC;h
pC;h
pNF;h
pNF;h
Ch
(40)
Cc;h
Cc;h
=
NFh
NF h

pNF;h
pNF;h
pc
pc
NFh
for c 2 NF (41)
Cc;h;V AT
Cc;h;V AT
=
Cc;h
Cc;h

pc
pc
pp;c(1 + tV AT )
pp;c(1 + tV AT )
V ATc
for c 2 F;NF (42)
Demand of production output for consumption goods:
As;c
As;c
=
Cc
Cc

pp;c
pp;c
pA;s
pA;s
NEc
for s 2 NEN (43)
Ec
Ec
=
Cc
Cc

pp;c
pp;c
pE;c
pE;c
NEc
(44)
AELE;c
AELE;c
=
Ec
Ec

pE;c
pE;c
pA;ELE
pA;ELE
Ec
(45)
FEc
FEc
=
Ec
Ec

pE;c
pE;c
pFE;c
pFE;c
Ec
(46)
As;c
As;c
=
FEc
FEc

pFE;c
pFE;c
pA;s
pA;s
FEc
for s 2 FEN (47)
Government demand:
IG
IG
=
As;G
As;G
=
G
G
(48)
Demand for inputs for investment good production:
As;I
As;I
=
I
I
(49)
Demand for domestic and imported capital:
KD
KD
=
K
K

pK
pK
pKD
pKD
K
(50)
KM
KM
=
K
K

pK
pK
pKM(1 + tKM)
pKM(1 + tKM)
K
(51)
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Supply of capital to the domestic and foreign market:
KDh
KDh
=

pKS;h
pKS;h
pKD(1  tI;h)
pKD(1  tI;h)
KS
(52)
KXh
KXh
=

pKS;h
pKS;h
pKX
pKX
KS
(53)
I.4.3 Market Clearing Conditions
Armington good:
As =
X
ss
As;ss +
X
c
As;c + As;STK + As;G + As;I (54)
Capital: X
h
Kh = K (55)
K +KM = KD +KX +K = KX +K (56)
KD =
X
h
KDh (57)
KX =
X
h
KXh (58)
K =
X
s
Ks (59)
Labour and leisure:
(1  u)
X
h
(Lh   LEh) =
X
s
Ls (60)
Consumption goods:
Cc =
X
h
Cc;h (61)
Domestic investment:
I =
X
h
Sh (62)
Balance of payments:
BOP =
X
s
(pX;sXs   pM;sMs) + pKX
X
h
KXh   pKMKM (63)
All other market clearing conditions are trivial, because they consist only of a single
demand and a single supply component.
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I.4.4 Household Budget Constraints
Budget constraints of private households (extended income, including correction
term for savings):
Yh = pU;hUh =
 
pKS;h Kh + pLS;h Lh   TAh

(1  tI;h) + TRh + (pS;h   pI)Sh (64)
Government budget constraint:
pGG =
X
s
(tY;spY;sYs + tM;spA;sMs) +
X
s
tPRpLLs
+ tKMpKMKM +
X
c;h;V AT
tV ATpp;cCc;h;V AT
+
X
h
tI;h
 
pKD;hKDh + (1  u)(Lh   LEh)pL   TAh

+
X
h
tS;h(1  u)(Lh   LEh)pL
 
X
h
TRh  
X
s
pA;sAs;STK  BOP  
X
h
u(Lh   LEh)
pC;h
pC;h
b (57)
I.4.5 Additional Equations for Unemployment
The supply price of labour is a weighted average of the after-tax wage and the
unemployment benet, which is indexed to the consumer price index:
pLS;h
pLS;h
= (1  u)
pL
pL
(1  tS;h   tI;h) + u
pC;h
pC;h
b (66)
The unemployment rate is determined through a wage curve, which depends on
the coe¢cient of residual income progression. We assume that the tax rates of the
median household (h = M) are the relevant ones:
u
u
=
1  tI;M

1  TAMYM

1  tI;M
1  tI;M
1  tI;M

1  TAM
YM
 (67)
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Sensitivity analysis for
Economic E¤ects of VAT Reforms in Germany
by Stefan Boeters, Christoph Böhringer, Thiess Büttner,
and Margit Kraus
Sensitivity analysis (1): Elasticity of labour supply doubled (0.3 instead of 0.15). We
compare the macroeconomic e¤ects (Table 13 in the paper):
Scenario 1 3 5 7
Tax recycling instrument VAT MITR ITA SSC
GDP 0.14 0.33 -0.14 0.56
Employment 0.04 0.13 -0.29 0.50
Domestic capital use 0.27 0.70 0.06 0.64
Total consumption 0.05 0.10 -0.42 0.41
Total investment 0.14 0.61 0.17 0.62
Imports -0.29 -0.14 -0.67 0.13
Exports 0.01 0.60 -0.54 0.77
Table entries are given as percentage changes.
Table 1: Higher elasticity of labour supply: macro e¤ects
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Sensitivity analysis (2): Elasticity of labour supply halved (0.075 instead of 0.15):
Scenario 1 3 5 7
Tax recycling instrument VAT MITR ITA SSC
GDP 0.12 0.42 -0.03 0.34
Employment 0.02 0.22 -0.16 0.25
Domestic capital use 0.25 0.62 0.16 0.46
Total consumption 0.02 -0.01 -0.29 0.14
Total investment 0.13 0.56 0.24 0.51
Imports -0.32 -0.24 -0.55 -0.12
Exports -0.03 0.42 -0.33 0.36
Table entries are given as percentage changes.
Table 2: Lower elasticity of labour supply: macro e¤ects
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Sensitivity analysis (3): Elasticity of subsitution in production ((KE); L) doubled (1 in-
stead of 0.5):
Scenario 1 3 5 7
Tax recycling instrument VAT MITR ITA SSC
GDP 0.14 0.39 -0.05 0.41
Employment 0.02 0.14 -0.22 0.33
Domestic capital use 0.29 0.75 0.19 0.52
Total consumption 0.03 0.02 -0.34 0.22
Total investment 0.14 0.59 0.22 0.54
Imports -0.29 -0.17 -0.57 -0.05
Exports 0.04 0.64 -0.32 0.49
Table entries are given as percentage changes.
Table 3: Higher elasticity of substitution in production: macro e¤ects
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Sensitivity analysis (4): Elasticity of subsitution in production ((KE); L) halved (0.25
instead of 0.5):
Scenario 1 3 5 7
Tax recycling instrument VAT MITR ITA SSC
GDP 0.12 0.34 -0.08 0.41
Employment 0.03 0.17 -0.20 0.32
Domestic capital use 0.23 0.57 0.09 0.51
Total consumption 0.03 0.03 -0.33 0.22
Total investment 0.13 0.56 0.21 0.54
Imports -0.32 -0.24 -0.61 -0.05
Exports -0.05 0.38 -0.45 0.48
Table entries are given as percentage changes.
Table 4: Lower elasticity of substitution in production: macro e¤ects
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